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I. Response to Dr. Baruch's Statement of Course of Proceedings.

The Plaintiff/Respondent (hereinafter referred to as "Dr. Baruch") incorrectly states that
the Defendant!Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Bill") requested "two pre-trial rulings" from
the magistrate court. 1 Bill never requested any pretrial rulings nor did he file any pretrial
motions with the court and Dr. Baruch's claims in this regard are contradicted by the record in
this case.
Dr. Baruch alleges that Bill sought two pretrial rulings, the first of which she claims that
Bill requested a ruling that because his real estate development projects were under water he
"wanted essentially all of the community assets.,,2 She further alleges that Bill requested the trial
court to "rule as a matter of law ... that since the balance in his retirement account on the day of
trial was less than it was on the day of marriage, that automatically it was all Appellant's
separate property.,,3 The record reflects in this case that Bill never file a single pretrial motion
and certainly did not request any ruling "as a matter of law" on any issue. Notably, Dr. Baruch
fails to cite to anywhere in the record where such claims are supported.
What actually transpired was that the magistrate court requested both parties to submit
pretrial briefing on two specific issues that were likely to arise at trial: Bill's retirement account
and the valuation of Bill's development entities that were financially challenged. (R., p. 155.)
The court ordered the parties to submit the pretrial briefs no later than December 18, 2009. (R.,
p. 155.)

Respondent's Brief, p. 2.
!d. at 2-3.
3 Id. at 2-3.
I

2
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Dr. Baruch argued that although Bill's development companies were underwater, that
they should be awarded to him at a zero value. Bill argued that the entities should be awarded to
him at their actual value. She further claims that with regard to Bill's argument that the Court
"denied that obvious inequitable claim." The court issued no ruling on the pretrial briefs and the
record will reflect that the court did not enter a single pretrial order. (R., p. 4-6.) Notably, Dr.
Baruch fails to cite to any alleged motion or any order.
The trial was originally scheduled to occur on October 1,2009, but was later rescheduled
for October 30, 2009. (R., p. 4.) The parties stipulated to vacate the October 30th trial date and it
was rescheduled for March 31, 2010. (R., p. 5.) The court requested the parties to
pretrial briefing on the issues related to the valuation of Bill's business entities and Bill's
retirement account and those briefs were due on December 18, 2009. (R., p. 155.) Both pm
submitted the briefing to the court. Dr. Baruch alleges that Bill requested pretrial rulings on
these issues and the court denied his requests; those statements are simply not true. The court
requested briefing on the issue of the valuation of the business and the retirement account. It was
Bill's position that because the entities had negative values, that they should be awarded to him
at a negative value. (R., p. 155.) Dr. Baruch argued that they should be awarded to Bill at no
value, despite the fact that the parties had executed personal guarantees on the debt in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars. The Court made no rulings in the affirmative or negative
based upon the parties' pretrial briefs and issued no pretrial orders. Furthermore, Dr.

B~ruch's

incorrect statement that certain claims of Bill's were "denied" by the court makes no sense in
light of the fact that the court permitted Bill to present evidence and argue the issues at trial.
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After the magistrate received the briefing status conferences were held on December 22,
2009 and January 27, 2010. There are no transcripts from the status conferences, there are no
motions in the court file, and there are no oral or written orders.
Contrary to Dr. Baruch's claims about Bill changing his position at trial, it was Dr.
Baruch who abandoned her argument that Bill should be awarded the businesses at zero values at
the time of trial.

Dr. Baruch has disregarded the court record and misstates the procedural

history of this case.

II. Response to Dr. Baruch's Statement of the Facts and Corrections to Appellant's
Statement of Facts.
Bill will respond to Dr. Baruch's corrections to Bill's statement of facts in the order
addressed in her brief.
A.

Dr. Baruch directs this Court to page 8 of Appellant's Brief that states, "after Bill

and Dr. Baruch were married, no funds were put into the Veltex Building, LLC" and notes that
the citation is incorrect. The citation in the brief directed the Court to Tr. Vol. I, p. 418, L. 1519. This citation does contain a typographical error; the correct citation is to page 412, not page
418, and the transcript provides:

Q.

After the time you and Amy, did you put any money into Veltex Building,
LLC?

A.

No.

Mr. Bevis: After what?
Mr. Welsh:

After their marriage.
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(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 412, L. 15-19.) The factual statement contained in Bill's brief that no funds were
put into Veltex Building, LLC after marriage is correct and is supported by the record; the brief
simply contained the incorrect page number.
B.

Bill Clark did testify that he received a capital gains distribution from Veltex

Building, LLC in the amount of $342,149 which was deposited directly into his Charles Schwab
account and then used towards the acquisition of the Ketchum Condominium. Bill cited to Tr.,
Vol 1, P. 421, L. 4-16, p. 422, L 4-9, Defendant's Exhibit 596, Bate Stamp 1283, and Plaintiffs
Exhibit 232. Dr. Baruch correctly notes that this testimony was objected to at trial and the
objection was overruled. The testimony is supported by the transcript.
C.

Dr. Baruch claims that Exhibit 517A was not admitted at trial despite the fact that

Exhibit 517 A is clearly marked as "admitted" in the Clerk's Record. There was no objection
filed by Dr. Baruch to the Clerk's Record. Nonetheless, Bill does agree that the transcript does
not appear to reflect that Exhibit 517A was one of the exhibits that was admitted. Bill does not
rely "heavily" on this exhibit as asserted by Dr. Baruch and if this Court so chooses not to
consider it as being admitted it does not alter or subtract from Bill's argument.
D.

Dr. Baruch characterizes Bill's statement that he did not withdraw to himself

IRA funds as being a clever, but misleading choice of words. Bill did refer to the transfer of
funds as "rollovers" because that is what they were-they were rolled over into other retirement
accounts. This is the crux of Bill's argument and the basic foundation that supports his position;
there is a key difference between transferring funds between retirement accounts and transferring
or withdrawing funds out of a retirement account into a non-retirement account. Dr. Baruch's
claim that the funds were "spent on his investments" is not correct. The funds were rolled over
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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into two other retirement accounts: Pensco Trust and Sterling Trust. Both of these retirement
accounts are self-directed plans that do provide the individual with the ability to direct how
retirement dollars are invested. Dr. Baruch blames Bill for the fact that some of the investrn.
did not turn out to be profitable, nonetheless, the funds were not "spent."
Bill is compelled to respond to Dr. Baruch's statement of the facts and briefly addresses
some inaccuracies below.
Schwab Retirement Accounts
With regard to the Schwab Retirement Accounts, Dr. Baruch incorrectly claims that "Bill
and his attorney conceded at trial that said amount was her separate property.,,4 Notably,

iigalH,

Dr. Baruch fails to cite to any place in the transcript where any such concession was made.
Rather she cites to Bill's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R., p. 441,
32.)

As set forth in detail in Appellant's Brief, it is Bill's position-and it has always been

Bill's position-that both he and Dr. Baruch's retirement accounts should be treated in the same
manner. Bill's position has remained the same, which is that if Dr. Baruch were to be awarded
the balance in her account on the date of marriage as her separate property, so too should Bill.
This position is reflected in Bill's discussion of the treatment of his retirement account in
same Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and as reflected on Exhibit A attached
to his brief. (R., p. 439-40, 458 item 30.)

4

Respondent's Brief, pp. 6-7.
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Dr. Baruch discusses Bill's "withdrawals" from his Schwab 3713 IRA; however the
evidence at trial established that Bill did not withdraw any substantial funds from his account. 5
Rather, Bill rolled over some of his retirement funds from the Schwab 3713 IRA into two other
retirement accounts, but did not take distributions from his IRA. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 434, L. 5-9.)
All funds were rolled over and transferred between two other retirement accounts Pensco Trust
and Sterling Trust. Bill testified at trial that all three of the accounts, Schwab 3713 IRA, Pensco
Trust and Sterling Trust are all IRAs in his name. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 483, L. 9-18.)
Dr. Baruch points to Plaintiff's Exhibit 235 and claims that the community contributed
funds to the account during marriage. However, the community also contributed significant
funds to her account during marriage so there is no distinction between the two. She also argues
that Bill's account fluctuated during marriage and it was unclear what percentage of the decrease
in value was a result of market conditions and of that percentage was community and separate
funds. Again, there is no way to determine which portion of her accounts were community or
separate either, but this did not prevent the court from determining that the balance in her
account on the date of marriage was separate property.
Ketchum Condominium Trace
It was undisputed at trial that Bill acquired his ownership interest in Veltex Building,

LLC prior to marriage. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 412, L. 1-5; p. 232, L. 4-8; Defendant's Exhibit 517.) It
was undisputed at trial that after the parties were married, no funds were put into Veltex

As the magistrate court noted, Bill received one de minimus distribution in the amount of $ I ,495.24 in 2007. (R.,
p.570.)

5
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Building, LLC. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 418, L. 15-19.) Therefore, all capital contributions made by Bill
were contributed before the parties were married. Bill testified that the $342,149 he received on
February 7, 2007 were capital gains.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 420, 6-15.) Dr. Baruch presented no

evidence or testimony to rebut or even contradict this evidence.
Rather, Dr. Baruch argues that the distribution is presumed to be income because it was
received during the marriage. As addressed in more detail below, this analysis is flawed because
the character of property attaches on the date of acquisition-Bill's interest in Veltex Building,
LLC was acquired prior to marriage.

Dr. Baruch further argues that the $342,149 was

"generated" as a result of Bill's "labor" and "sweat equity." (R., p. 588.) However, Bill was
already being compensated for his labor through Clark Development, LLC. Bill testified that
none of the equity in Veltex Building, LLC was due to any sweat equity because Clark
Development, LLC was paid a fee for developing the project. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 626, L. 11-28.)
Bill historically has received a draw from Clark Development, LLC after expenses are paid,
which is his primary source of income. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 238.) In 2009, he was receiving income
of $15,000 per month until April of 2009. (/d.) As of January 2010, Clark Development, LLC
was receiving income of $15,000, which after expenses were paid Bill received approximately
$8,500 per month. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 244.) Therefore, to the extent that the community contributed
any sweat equity or labor towards the project after marriage, Bill was compensated for that labor
through his income from Clark Development, LLC.

Dr. Baruch failed to establish or even

present any evidence to support a claim that the community was not adequately compensated.
Finally, Dr. Baruch's claim that Bill avoided the question regarding when construction
was begun or completed is not supported by the transcript. Bill's testimony was as follows:
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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Mr. Bevis:
Bill:

And do you recognize that publication?

Not specifically. I certainly know what it's about.

Q.
It does say that the Veltex Building was completed
correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Is that accurate?

A.

Yes.

III

2004;

IS

that

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 511, L. 19-25.) From this testimony, it is hard to see how this testimony could be
characterized as anything but direct. There is no testimony in the transcript where Bill
about when construction commenced and did not respond or attempted to avoid the question.
III. Response to Dr. Baruch's Request for Attorney Fees.
Dr. Baruch requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121
claiming that this Appeal is pursued frivolously. Dr. Baruch requested attorney fees from the
district court on the same grounds. The district court denied the request and her subsequent
motion to reconsider. (R., p. 841.) Dr. Baruch did not appeal those orders to this Court.
Bill has not pursued this appeal frivolously and there is no basis for fees under Idaho
Code Section 12-121.
This Court set forth the requirements for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho
Code § 12-121:
An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is not a
matter of right to the prevailing party, but is appropriate only when
the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the
case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably,
or without foundation. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. V
Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001).
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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When deciding whether the case was brought, pursued, or
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the
entire course of the litigation must be taken into account. Id
Thus, if there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may
not be awarded under I.C. Section 12-121 even though the losing
party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation. Id. Although an award of
attorney fees under the statue is discretionary, the award must be
supported by findings, and those findings, in tum, must be
supported by the record. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho
792,41 P.3d 220 (2002).

McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833,844 (2003) (emphasis added).
"Fees under I.e. § 12-121 are not awarded to a prevailing party as a matter of right but,
rather, are subject to the district court's discretion." Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 29U,

L"l-O

P.3d 391, 399 (2010). "A district court should only award fees 'when it is left with the abiding
belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably,

0[,

foundation.'" C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76,82 (2001). "However, 'when
a party pursues an action which contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to
be frivolous and without foundation.'" /d. "A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because
the district court concludes that it fails as a matter of law." Gulf Chern. Employees Fed Credit

Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984). "Furthermore, 'f31
misperception of the law, or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable.
Rather, the question is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, but so plainly
fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. '" Snipes v.

Schalo, 130 Idaho 890,893,950 P.2d 262, 265 (Ct.App.1997).
Bill's appeal was not brought frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.

Dr.

Baruch fails to present any argument or analysis explaining how or why she believes Bill's
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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appeal was frivolous. Rather, she just makes the sweeping statement that Bill simply invited this
Court to second guess the trial court on conflicting evidence. Bill did not invite this
second guess the trial court on conflicting evidence. Bill submitted extensive briefing to
Court on appeal, not second-guessing conflicting evidence, but disputing the legal analysis and
the application of the law to the facts.
It is Bill's position that this appeal was not brought frivolously or unreasonably since the

magistrate court's decision to deny Bill's separate property claims was an abuse of discretion in
that insufficient evidence to support those findings was presented to the magistrate court. The
district court erred in affirming the magistrate's holding.
IV. Response to Dr. Baruch's Standards of Review.
Dr. Baruch infers on page 18, at footnote 7, that Bill incorrectly stated as fact
magistrate found that the distribution Bill received was a capital gain.

Bill made no such

incorrect statement. Bill stated in the procedural history portion of his brief that "The magistrate
further held that the capital gains distribution Bill received on one of his separate business
entities was community and therefore he was not entitled to any reimbursement..." (Appellant's
Brief, p. 5.) The magistrate stated in his Memorandum Decision and Order,
Bill's argument rests on the undisputed fact that he received a distribution from
Veltex Building LLC shortly before making the down payment on the Ketchum
condominium, and relies on the presumption that the entire amount he received
was his separately. This presumption appears to be based on his belief that capital
gains from a separate asset received during marriage are separate property, a
proposition that the Court can find no support.
(R., p. 582.) The Court found that a capital gain earned on separate property is not separate
property.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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The Court later corrected this statement of the law after Bill filed his Motion to Alter or
Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In the Order Re: Motion to Alter or Amend
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment the magistrate stated, "The Court corrects
the statement found on page 22, lines 12-15, in the Conclusions of Law that' ...capital gains from
a separate asset received during marriage are separate property... ' because the court meant to say
that capital gains from separate assets are not always separate property." (R., p. 680.)
V. The District Court Did Err in Affirming the Magistrate's Finding That the
Entirety of Bill's Charles Schwab SEPIIRA # ...3713 was Community Property.
Dr. Baruch argues that the holdings in Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho 85, 822 P.2d 982
(1991) and McCoy v. McCoy, 125 Idaho 199,868 P.2d 527 (Ct.App.l994) should only apply
where an account increases in value and not where an account decreases in value, but provides
no rationale for why such a distinction should be drawn. Under this analysis, the community
would reap all of the benefit, but not share in any of the risks associated with investing.
Dr. Baruch incorrectly states that Bill Clark "withdrew" funds from his account and relies
upon Plaintiffs Exhibit 235 which was a document she prepared. The actual supporting account
statements from Charles Schwab reflect that Bill did not take distributions. 6

(Defendant's

Exhibits 642-648.) All funds were rolled over and transferred between two other retirement
accounts Pensco Trust and Sterling Trust. Bill testified at trial that all three of the accounts,
Schwab 3713 IRA, Pensco Trust and Sterling Trust are all IRAs in his name. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.

6 As the magistrate court noted, Bill received one de minimus distribution in the amount 0[$1,495.24 in 2007. (R.,
p.570.)
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483, L. 9-18.) All of which are essentially one, big IRA held in three different entities. (/d.)
There were transfers and investments made within each of them during the marriage. (Id.) Bill
never made any withdrawals to himself from any of the three accounts. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 483, L.
19-22.)
It has always been Bill's position that the analysis under McCoy and Maslen control, but

that the analysis is equally applicable to both his and Dr. Baruch's accounts. The magistrate
court provided no rationale or explanation as to how it arrived at its conclusion to award Dr.
Baruch the balance of her 401(k) on the date of marriage. At the conclusion of the trial the
magistrate found that Bill's account was distinguishable from the Maslen and McCoy cases
because (1) he "withdrew" funds and (2) because the community contributed to the account after
marriage and therefore the account was commingled and could not be traced. (R., p. 585.)
The community made significant contributions to Dr. Baruch's account and the account
increased in value by nearly $400,000 during marriage. On the date of marriage, Bill's account
was valued at $386,636. The magistrate court found that the community made contributions
towards Bill's account and that the account was community because it was comingled with
community funds. However, community funds were contributed to both accounts and therefore
both accounts have been comingled. There is no way to determine on either of the accounts
whether it was the separate portion or community portion of the accounts that increased or
decreased in value. The magistrate court's finding that Bill withdrew funds was not supported
by the evidence as there was no evidence that any funds were withdrawn from the Schwab 3713
IRA.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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Dr. Baruch argues that there was a stipulation that her account funds were separate.
There was no such stipulation. Mr. Welsh stated at the hearing on the Motion for Leave to Alter
or Amend:
Mr. Welsh: And I want to make it clear, Your Honor, I think the court knows
we never conceded. We took the same argument with her account as we did to
my client's account. I think the court knows that. When you say counsel tried to
suggest to you that we conceded the separate property, I don't think the court
hopefully believes that. We argued as to both accounts, they were separate based
upon Maslen and McCoy.
Court: They were separate at the time of marriage.
Mr. Welsh: Yes, Your Honor. Exactly. And stayed separate at the time of
divorce, that portion under our analysis from Maslen and McCoy.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 666, L. 10-23.) It has always been Bill's position that Maslen and McCoy apply
equally to both his retirement and Dr. Baruch's retirement account. Dr. Baruch's claim that Bill
did not raise this argument until the appeal is simply incorrect and contradicted by the record.
Either Maslen and McCoy apply to both or they apply to neither; his position on appeal is
entirely consistent. He has argued, among other things, that the magistrate erred by applying the
cases to Dr. Baruch's account and not to his.
Finally, Dr. Baruch suggests that the district court's conclusion that Bill stipulated to the
treatment of Dr. Baruch's retirement account as being her separate property when the district
court relied upon a portion of the transcript where Bill made a concession related to an entirely
different account is simply harmless error; this mistake is far from harmless error. 7 It is hard to

fathom how the district court's conclusion that a stipulation was made by Bill and in support of

As set forth in detail in Appellant's Brief, the district court found that Bill conceded that Dr. Baruch's 401(k) was
her separate property and relied on the following testimony, "Are you claiming any interest in that IRA?" "No, I

7
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that conclusion relies on a portion of the transcript where Bill stipulated to an entirely different
account can amount to harmless error.

To the contrary, this constitutes error because the

conclusion is not supported by the evidence in the record.
Dr. Baruch label's Bill as "greedy" and "litigious" simply because it is his position that
the balance of his retirement account on the date of their marriage is his separate property, just as
the balance of her retirement account on the date of their marriage was deemed her separate
property.
The magistrate court abused its discretion because it failed to act within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the applicable rules and its decision was

HUl

made with an exercise of reason. Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 195, 765 P.2d 1094, 1097
(Ct.App.1988). The district court erred in affirming the magistrate's decision.

VI. The District Court Did Err in Affirming the Magistrate's Finding that the
Capital Gains Distribution was Community Property.
Dr. Baruch's entire argument regarding Bill's Veltex distribution is based upon the
magistrate court's incorrect application of the law.

She argues that the $342,149 capital

distribution that was made during the marriage was properly deemed income by the court
because the court found that significant labor and efforts were contributed to the project during
marriage.
It was undisputed at trial that Bill acquired his ownership interest in Veltex Building,
LLC prior to marriage. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 412, L. 1-5; p. 232, L. 4-8; Defendant's Exhibit 517.) It

don't claim any interest in it." "We will agree to treat it as separate property." (R., p. 834) Bill was referring to
Exhibit 234 which was a small IRA with a value of approximately $3,361. He was not testifYing about the 401(k).
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Page 14

was undisputed at trial that after the parties were married, no funds were put into Veltex
Building, LLC. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 418, L. 15-19.) Therefore, all capital contributions made by Bill
were contributed before the parties were married. Bill's interest in the entity was acquired
to marriage, not during marriage. Dr. Baruch presumes that because the funds were disbursed
during marriage that the date of the disbursement is the date the asset is characterized. However,
under Idaho law, the character of property vests at the time the property is acquired. Winn v.

Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 815, 673 P.2d 411, 415 (1983). Bill testified that the $342,194 was a
capital gains distribution.

Dr. Baruch presented no evidence or testimony to rebut or even

contradict this evidence.
Significantly, Dr. Baruch completely ignored and did not even address Bill's legal
analysis discussing the Speer, Swope, and Wolford line of cases. It appears that she dov
disagree with Bill's legal analysis.
Bill agrees and does not dispute that he must trace the funds applied to the Ketchum
Condominium to his separate property to a reasonable degree of certainty. Bill has met that
burden.

The magistrate court erred in its conclusion that the capital gains distribution was

income and that it was income because the community had contributed efforts towards Bill's
separate property. Under Idaho law, the party seeking reimbursement as a result of alleged
community contribution with respect to separate property has the burden of proving that
community expenditures have enhanced the value of the separate property and the amount of the
enhancement. Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 173,898 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1995); Josephson v.

Josephson, 115 Idaho 1142, 772 P.2d 1236 (Ct. App. 1989); Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546
P.2d 1169, (1976); Hooker v. Hooker, 95 Idaho 518, 511 P.2d, 800 (1972); and Swope v. Swope,
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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122 Idaho 296, 834 P.2d 298 (1992) (emphasis added) (hereinafter referred to as Swope II).
With regard to the burden of proof, the Supreme Court has ruled that, not only must the party
claiming a community reimbursement from a separate property business demonstrate that
value of the business increased during the years of the marriage, the party must also demonstrate
why the value ofthe separate property business increased. Swope, supra.
Furthermore, there was no evidence presented at trial as to any community efforts or
labor were expended towards Veltex Building, LLC. Rather, the magistrate simply assumed
such labor based purely upon the fact that construction of the building occurred during the
marriage and stated, " ... my finding was based upon my determination that it was more prooaolc
than not that Mr. Clark put a significant amount of effort into this project in the planning,
building, and selling of the units after they were married." (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 678-679.)
addressed in Appellant's Brief, even if the court's finding that labor was expended were
supported by the evidence, the community was compensated by Bill's monthly paycheck from
Clark Development, LLC. Clark Development, LLC was paid a fee for developing the project.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 626, L. 11-28.) Bill has fully addressed this legal analysis in his appeal brief and
Dr. Baruch has not responded at all to the legal arguments set forth therein, so Bill will not
reiterate that argument here.
With regard to Dr. Baruch's claim that Bill's accounting in tracing the actual funds
contained errors. First she argues that Bill did not account for the $1,631.60 in community
dividends and interest added to the Schwab account in February and the $1,943.23 in community
and dividends added to the account in March. With regard to the $1,943.23 in dividends, of that
amount $1,904.50 of those dividends were added on March 30, 2007, which is after the $176,000
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was withdrawn on March 27th and is therefore after the relevant time period. (Defendant's
Exhibit 596, bates stamp 1294.) If the Court deems that it is appropriate, Bill has no objection
reducing the $107,146.07 by $1,670.33 ($38.73 for March dividends + $1,631.60
February dividends).
Most significantly, Dr. Baruch incorrectly states that the $10,000 check was withdrawn
on March 28,2007 after the $176,000 check cleared."g However, Defendant's Exhibit 596, bates
stamp 1293 reflects that the $176,000 check and the $10,000 check both cleared on the same
day; March 28, 2007. It does not show that the $10,000 check cleared before the $176,000

check. Significantly, and in support of Bill's argument, the $10,000 check was written on IVldflii
26, 2007, one day before the $176,000 check written on March 2ih. (Defendant's Exhibit 596,
bates stamps 1306-07.)
The Veltex capital gains distribution was Bill's separate property and Bill traced those
funds to a reasonable degree of certainty to the acquisition of the Ketchum condominium and is
entitled to be reimbursed for those funds.
VII.

Conclusion

Bill respectfully requests this Court to grant his appeal and reverse the district court and
conclude that the balance of Bill's IRA on the date of marriage is his separate property and
therefore the account, since it is less than that balance, is Bill's separate property.

In the

alternative, if this Court characterizes Bill's account as community, then Bill respectfully
requests the Court to hold that Dr. Baruch's account should also be characterized as community
property.

Bill further respectfully requests this Court to conclude that he is entitled to
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reimbursement in the amount of $107,146.07 for his separate property contributions towards the
acquisition ofthe Ketchum Condominium.
DATED:

April 25, 2012

COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP

By:

\~l~~-

MA'tKENZIE W
COTT
Attorneys for Defen antiAppellant

8

Respondent's Brief, p. 36 (emphasis original).
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 25 th day of April, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
James A. Bevis
BEVIS JOHNSON & THIRY, PA
412 East Parkcenter Blvd., Ste. 211
Boise, Idaho 83706
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Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Overnight Courier
Facsimile
Email

Attorneys for Defe

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

antiAppellant

Page 19

